Connecticut State Court Judges Adopt Electronic Discovery Rules

Posted on July 20, 2011 by N. Kane Bennett

Connecticut state court judges recently adopted new electronic discovery rules.  The rules will become part of the Connecticut Practice Book for civil discovery and take effect on January 2, 2012.  

The judges present at the annual meeting unanimously adopted the new electronic discovery rules. You can read the new e-discovery rules here.  I removed the sections not relevant to civil cases.  The new rules or modifications are indicated by the underlined portions of the rule. 

Here is a quick hit list, and my brief commentary, of the new e-discovery rules in Connecticut state courts:

  • Definitions of electronic and electronically stored information (ESI) added to the list of definitions.  The new definitions are intentionally broad to adapt to new technology changes.
  • Grounds to move for a protective order in discovery include the terms and conditions of discovery of ESI and the allocation of costs between the parties.  This rule permits the court to take into account a series of factors in fashioning a protective order and cost shifting for discovery of ESI.
  • Litigants should be disclosing ESI that is readily accessible and likely to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence.  This basically clarifies that reasonably accessible ESI is no different than other types of discovery. 
  • Whether a litigant needs to disclose ESI that is not reasonably accessible will depend on a variety of factors that the court may consider. 
  • Court can shift the costs of production for ESI.
  • ESI added to the list of information a party can demand to inspect.
  • Safe harbor from sanctions for not only ESI, but all information, that is lost if the information is lost as the result of routine, good faith operation of a system or process in the absence of showing of intentional actions designed to avoid known discovery obligations.  This rule is based on the federal rule 37(f) safe harbor and the commentary indicates that good faith may require a party to stop or intervene a routine destruction policy.
  • Claw back provisions permit a party to notify an opponent of inadvertently disclosed privileged information.  There is a procedure the party must follow upon receipt of the notice.  The rule does not address issues of waiver of privilege by the inadvertent disclosure. 

Until Connecticut courts interpret these provisions, a good resource for attorneys may be found in the commentary to the rules.  Additionally, the new rules are based on  the Uniform Rules Relating to the Discovery of ESI adopted by the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws in 2007.  There are various courts in other states that have interpreted these rules. 

Tags: , , , , ,

Some Guidance From Delaware On Seeking Corporate Books and Records in Connecticut

Posted on June 21, 2011 by N. Kane Bennett

If you own shares of a corporation or an interest in a limited liability company, there are two basic sources in Connecticut concerning your rights to have access to company books and records.  The first source may be found in any agreements that concern governance of the company such as the by-laws of a corporation or the operating of a limited liability company.  The second source may be found in Connecticut's General Statutes (limited liability company records; business corporation records). 

The statutes permit an owner to make written demand for access to company books and records and to bring a lawsuit in court if the demand is refused.  Although the process seems straight foward enough, many times it is not.  Management may deny the request and claim the request is overly broad, not sufficiently detailed under the statute,  or sought for an improper purpose.  In Connecticut, the results of "books and records" cases are not consistent and a proper demand for books and records in not always clear. If the demand is not proper, a court will not grant the request.

As in many instances when matters are not clear in Connecticut, Delaware law is always a good resource.  Here is an informative article by Jeff Mordock of the Delaware Business Court Insider (you have to subscribe for free to get the full article) that discusses some of the details in drafting a proper, or more likely to be enforced, books and records demand.   

Tags: , , , , ,

Navigating FINRA's Mandatory Arbitration Requirement - An Overview

Posted on March 14, 2011 by N. Kane Bennett

 Raymond & Bennett attorney Joseph Blyskal contributed the following post to this Blog.

 I recently read an article indicating that arbitration was the preferred forum for member companies of the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority, but with a caveat--that the only real reason it was preferred was as damage control for the industry. With only some exceptions, the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority (FINRA) requires arbitration of industry disputes, which simply means disputes amongst or between its members and associated persons. In addition, while nonmembers can compel members to arbitrate, nonmembers of FINRA cannot be compelled to arbitrate. Regardless of whether the motive is fiscal, public relations, or other, the mandatory arbitration requirement may be hard to get around. However, the presence of a good faith claim against nonmembers can create the option to litigate an industry dispute outside of arbitration.   

                                        

                                                           

FINRA members are defined as any entity: “who is registered or has applied for registration under the Rules of FINRA” or  “[a] sole proprietor, partner, officer, director, or branch manager of a member, or other natural person occupying a similar status or performing similar functions, or a natural person engaged in the investment banking or securities business who is directly or indirectly controlling or controlled by a member, whether or not any such person is registered or exempt from registration with FINRA.”FINRA Manual Rule 13100(r). Some examples include: Metlife Securities, Inc., Bernad L. Madoff (now obviously inactive), and ING Financial Markets, LLC.

There are only a few enumerated exceptions to the mandatory arbitration rule. Disputes arising out of the insurance business activities of a member that is also an insurance company, claims alleging employment discrimination in violation of a statute, class actions, shareholder derivative actions, and matters that are inappropriate for the forum in light of the “purposes of FINRA and the intent of the Code” are excluded. FINRA Manual Rule 13200-13205. Depending on the circumstances, these are easily applied.

Less easily applied are the two threshold requirements that trigger mandatory arbitration for a dispute--that the dispute arises from the (1) business activities of (2) members or associated persons.  These must be addressed before considering the application of the exceptions.

Whether a dispute arises from business activities is a factual inquiry. It is liberally construed, however. It includes claims for commissions earned, discharge from employment, and non-statutory discrimination claims. Generally, this is a threshold element.  

The more litigation-friendly element is the second—that the dispute is between members, a member and an associated persons, or associated persons. Whether an entity is a FINRA member is not usually debatable (there are formal registration requirements). However, whether an entity is an “associated person” is often subject to debate.  Courts often deny motions to compel arbitration where a factual showing is not made to support a finding of “associated person” as defined in the Code.

Cases where there are parent companies and subsidiaries involved in the dispute, or where there are employees or registered representatives as parties that are not FINRA members, or not employed by FINRA members, are breeding grounds for litigation over this second threshold provision.

Of course, in any case—whether the threshold elements are present or an exception applies—the general rule that those not party to an agreement to arbitrate cannot be compelled to do so applies to the FINRA arbitration provision. Thus, litigation is clearly a viable option where there is at least one entity involved that is not a FINRA member.

While difficult to get around the arbitration provisions of FINRA, it may be possible to do so. Litigants, both those prosecuting and defending claims, should identify and categorize all the disputants before making a determination that arbitration is indeed “mandatory”.

Tags: , , , ,

Connecticut Bar Association Launches Blog

Posted on January 19, 2011 by N. Kane Bennett

Rule of Law Blog:

The Connecticut Bar Association has launched this new blog. The purpose of the blog is to "ensure a sustaining interest" in the discussion of "what our laws are doing right, what they are doing wrong, and how they can improve."    Today, there is a post related to President Obama's executive order related to reviewing the federal regulatory structure and its impact on business.  There is a good comparison of positions from the New York Times and the Wall Street Journal. I look foward to following the posts on this new blog. Congratulations to the CBA.

Tags: , , ,

CT Supreme Court Affirms Right To Challenge Foreign Judgment With Special Defense

Posted on September 8, 2010 by N. Kane Bennett

One of the many issues to consider when filing a lawsuit against a party in another state is how you will go about enforcing the judgment if you win.  For example, lets assume you live in Alaska and want to sue someone who lives in Connecticut.  You decide you do not want to hire a Connecticut lawyer, but instead decide to sue in Alaska state court.  You win a "default" judgment in the Alaska case because the Connecticut resident never appeared in the case or hired a lawyer to defend the case. 

Typically, in these circumstances, you take the judgment from one state, hire an attorney in the state where the defendant lives, and you "domesticate" the judgment.  In this example, you would take the Alaska state court judgment to a court in Connecticut and ask the Connecticut court to enforce it.  Under the Full Faith and Credit Clause of the United Stated Constitution, states have a duty to recognize or give "credit" to the "judicial proceedings" of every other state.  

Sounds simple right?  Not always the case.  There are various ways to challenge a foreign or out of state judgment.  One of the primary methods Connecticut attorneys use to challenge a foreign judgment is to contest the personal jurisdiction of the court that rendered the judgment.  This is exactly what happened in Maltas v. Maltas (download here) which was officially released yesterday by the Connecticut Supreme Court. 

John Maltas, an Alaskan resident, sued his brother Brian Maltas in Alaska state court.  He won a default judgment because his brother stayed in Connecticut and ignored the lawsuit.  John Maltas then filed a lawsuit in Connecticut seeking to enforce the default judgment.  Brian Maltas raised as a special defense that the Alaska court lacked jurisdiction over the matter in the first place and no "credit" should be given to the judgment.

At the trial level, John Maltas won summary judgment after arguing that personal jurisdiction may only be challenged in Connecticut state court through a motion to dismiss as opposed to asserting an answer with a special defense.  On appeal, the Connecticut Supreme Court reversed the decision and stated that a special defense may be used to contest whether the Alaska state court had jurisdiction to rule on a dispute involving a Connecticut resident.  As a result, all of John Maltas' efforts thus far, dating back to 2005, have been fruitless and reversed.  He may ultimately win at trial, but for now, jurisdictional defenses have defeated his claim without any hearing at all on the merits of the case.    

The takeaway here is that decisions regarding where to file suit are important, especially when the lawsuit will involve an out of state defendant.   There are ways to avoid or mitigate potential problems that may arise with domesticating a foreign judgment.  For example, you could elect to file the lawsuit where the defendant lives.  This may be an inconvenience in the short term, but it might also avoid jurisdictional problems when the time comes to enforce the judgment. Of course, the ability to enforce the judgment is only one of many issues to consider at the time of filing a lawsuit.

Tags: , , , , ,

eBay sued for $3.8 Billion - - Patent Troll or David v. Goliath?

Posted on July 15, 2010 by N. Kane Bennett

Is it David v. Goliath or a patent troll case?  Connecticut based XPRT Ventures, LLC has filed a lawsuit in the U.S. District Court in Delaware (download lawsuit here) against eBay for $3.8 billion dollars over the technology for automating and securing online payment portals. The suit was also filed against eBay's PayPal, Bill Me Later, Shopping.com, and StubHub.

In the suit, XPRT alleges that PayPal and others have used its systems and methods for electronic auction and e-commerce transactions subject to XPRT's six U.S. patents since at least 2002.  XPRT also alleges that eBay received confidential information in 2001 from the inventors and misappropriated information from patent applications assigned to XPRT. XPRT alleges a loss to date of $600 million with expected future losses of $3.2 billion.

The suit is for willful patent infringement, but at its heart is XPRT's allegation that eBay stole XPRT's trade secrets obtained from patent applications to use in eBay's own patent applications and for use by eBay in multiple platforms for PayPal and others.  The complaint states that XPRT passed on confidential information related to its patents to eBay in 2001 with the expectation of compensation should eBay be interested in the technology. The complaint alleges that the confidential information included how eBay could benefit from acquiring PayPal's payment platform.  Instead, eBay allegedly used the information provided in support of its own patent applications and online uses for PayPal and others.

The suit has been summarized and covered by various online media with some support and others criticizing the suit. Read here for the Reuters report on eBay suit and PCWorld's story.  Another good summary is the post today from Rajeev Saxena of Trends Updates. The post includes the following statement from XPRT's Connecticut based counsel, Steven Moore: 

This involves a trade secret theft, along with sheer patent infringement.  It is bad enough to take someone's technology, but it is a bit much to use it in your own patent application. 

Attorney Moore's firm also issued a press release that states, in part:

 In a nutshell, XPRT asserts eBay unfairly stole the idea and method of payment used in eBay's PayPal and similar electronic payment systems.

Techdirt, a technology blog, came out swinging and criticized the suit as "another patent lawsuit against a big company for doing something obvious, filed by a company that appears to exist solely for the purpose of suing a company that actually does stuff."   Mike also includes in his post some additional details about the history of XPRT's trail of patent rejections.  His take is basically that the case is a patent troll stick up suit.    For a good and balanced definition of "troll patent" or "patent troll" read this post form PatentlyO, the nations leading patent law blog.


Erik Sherman, a freelance writer, had a somewhat different take in his blog post.  After a providing a detailed summary of his own investigation and fact finding, Erik wrote that "this is not a simple case of a troll finding an obscure patent that could be stretched to cover an intended target."  He also focused on another case where eBay was alleged to have engaged in similar unethical behavior and the complications potentially created for Meg Whitman (eBay CEO at the time) currently running for California governor.

Thus far, eBay only issued a short statement denying that there is any merit to the suit. What's your take, Patent Trolling or David v. Goliath?

 

 

Tags: , , , , , , , ,

Computer Fraud and Abuse Act In Connecticut

Posted on July 6, 2010 by N. Kane Bennett

Previously, I have posted about non-compete agreements and the duty of loyalty for employees.  Many times, businesses do not have written contracts to protect confidential and proprietary information from not only competitors and vendors, but also their own employees.  Without a contract, the common law of Connecticut concerning breach of fiduciary duty is one of the ways attorneys can seek to protect business clients against improper use of confidential information.

Another method for attorneys to seek to protect their clients' confidential information stored on a computer system or network is through the federal Computer Fraud and Abuse Act (CFAA).  The CFAA is largely a criminal statute, but is being used more frequently in civil cases on behalf of businesses faced with loss or theft of confidential and proprietary information and trade secrets.   The CFAA, 18 U.S.C. 1030, essentially provides for civil liability for unauthorized access to protected computers with intent to defraud or cause damage.  There are civil enforcement provisions that allow private actions for recoverable loss related to prohibited conduct if a series of factors can be proved in court.

Recently, Peter J. Toren wrote an excellent article in the New York Law Journal  where he detailed methods in which the CFAA might be useful for attorneys to protect client trade secrets and other confidential information.   Peter listed the six factors necessary for proof of damages.  Peter also noted some of the limitations of the CFAA when it comes to employee theft of trade secrets and described the narrow and broad views taken by different courts when interpreting improper access of a protected computer without authorization. Peter further provides some useful tips for businesses on how to construct a policy in light of the different court interpretations of improper access. 

Lee Berlik, publisher of the Virginia Business Litigation Blog, also has a recent post about the series of hurdles necessary for attorneys to prove loss or damages under the CFAA.  Lee's post describes a threshold of $5,000 in value that must fit into the categories of potential loss defined in the CFAA.  Similar to Peter's article, Lee also describes how a case was unsuccessful in court because of insufficient facts to show loss under the CFAA.

In Connecticut federal courts, the reported cases under CFAA, largely have been unsuccessful for a variety of reasons, many of which Peter's article details.  Some cases were dismissed for failing to meet damages thresholds (Register.com v. Verio, 356 F.3d 393 (2004)) , while another case was dismissed because the facts were insufficient for unauthorized access (Cenveo, Inc. v. Rao, 659 F. Supp. 2d 312 2009)).   However, in a recent case, in the federal district court, Judge Vanessa Bryant issued an order of sanctions and for production of electronic devices for forensic inspection in a case based, in part, and the CFAA. (Genworth Financial Wealth Mngmt. Inc., v. McMullan). 

The takeaway here is that the CFAA provides another potential basis for a business to protect its confidential and proprietary information when the information resides on a computer system or network.  Of course, there are a series of factors that must be met before liability can be established.  Some of these factors may not apply and eliminate the CFAA as a method of recovery as we have seen in several reported cases.  However, the CFAA should be considered and evaluated in any case involving unauthorized access of confidential information through a computer system as it provides an additional basis for potential recovery.  Also, advanced planning with sound internal policies might provide a business with a better chance of success under the CFAA.

I will do a post soon on another statute, Connecticut's Computer Crime Act, that may provide additional remedies for improper access of a computer system or network.

 

 

Tags: , , , , , , , , , , ,